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In Finland, occurrence of  Klebsiella pneumoniae  car-
bapenemase-producing  K. pneumoniae  (KPC-KP) has 
previously been sporadic and related to travel. We 
describe the first outbreak of colonisation with KPC-KP 
strain ST512; it affected nine patients in a 137-bed 
primary care hospital. The index case was detected 
by chance when a non-prescribed urine culture was 
taken from an asymptomatic patient with suprapubic 
urinary catheter in June 2013. Thereafter, all patients 
on the 38-bed ward were screened until two screening 
rounds were negative and extensive control measures 
were performed. Eight additional KPC-KP-carriers were 
found, and the highest prevalence of carriers on the 
ward was nine of 38. All other patients hospitalised on 
the outbreak ward between 1 May and 10 June and 101 
former roommates of KPC-KP carriers since January 
had negative screening results. Two screening rounds 
on the hospital’s other wards were negative. No link to 
travel abroad was detected. Compared with non-car-
riers, but without statistical significance, KPC-KP car-
riers were older (83 vs 76 years) and had more often 
received antimicrobial treatment within the three 
months before screening (9/9 vs 90/133). No clinical 
infections occurred during the six-month follow-up. 
Early detection, prompt control measures and repeti-
tive screening were crucial in controlling the outbreak.
Introduction
Carbapenemase-producing  Enterobacteriaceae  (CPE) 
pose a severe health threat causing potentially incura-
ble infections because antimicrobial treatment options 
are limited due to the resistance. In the United States 
(US),  Klebsiella pneumoniae  carbapenemase (KPC) 
is the most common mechanism of carbapenemase 
resistance among Enterobacteriaceae, while met-
allo-beta-lactamases such as VIM, IMP and NDM are 
common especially in Asia [1]. Plasmid-encoded KPC 
was first identified in North Carolina in 1996 and has 
been increasingly reported worldwide, including in 
Israel since 2005 [1-3]. In the US, KPC strains first spread 
in short-stay acute care hospitals. Subsequently, KPC-
producing Enterobacteriaceae were recognised in long-
term care facilities and in a study in 2010/11, up to 30% 
colonisation prevalence has been detected e.g. in long-
term acute care hospitals [4].
In 2013, most European countries detected CPE: nine 
countries reported sporadic cases or single or sporadic 
hospital outbreaks, 11 reported regional or national 
spread and in Greece, Italy and Malta, CPE were reg-
ularly isolated in most hospitals and have become 
endemic [5]. Most outbreak reports before 2013 were 
from acute care hospitals [6-8]. The source of CPE in 
the index case is described only in some of the reports 
and was typically related to hospital transfers from 
abroad [6,8,9]. Also in the Nordic countries, sporadic 
cases of CPE have been documented among repatri-
ated hospital patients, causing some local spread or 
sporadic hospital outbreaks [10-12]. In Finland, trans-
mission of CPE between two patients was suspected 
only once, in 2011 [11].
Here, we present the first outbreak in a Finnish pri-
mary care hospital in summer 2013 with nine patients 
colonised with KPC-producing K. pneumoniae (KPC-KP) 
strain ST512. We describe the outbreak control 
measures and risk factors for KPC-KP carriage.
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Methods
Setting
The outbreak occurred in a 137-bed primary care hos-
pital (Hospital A) in the Helsinki metropolitan area, 
Finland, responsible for post-acute care of a catch-
ment population of 250,000. In addition, the area is 
served by a second hospital with tertiary care wards 
and three primary care wards (Hospital B). These wards 
provide acute care and transfer patients to Hospital A 
which has four wards: Ward A with 38 beds for geri-
atric patients, Ward B with 38 beds for orthogeriatric 
patients and rehabilitation, Ward C with 27 beds for 
rehabilitation of patients with cerebral insults and Ward 
D with 34 beds for terminal care and geriatric patients. 
Patients with carriage of multidrug-resistant organisms 
(MDRO; mainly meticillin-resistant  Staphylococcus 
aureus  (MRSA)) in this hospital are treated at Ward 
A in contact isolation. Usually, none or only few such 
patients are present and the ward therefore accepts 
also non-carriers in dedicated rooms to avoid empty 
beds.
Index case
The index case was detected on Ward A on 10 June 
2013 after a urine specimen was taken for culture from 
an asymptomatic patient who had been staying on that 
ward since February 2013. A nurse took the sample 
without a prescription because the patient’s cathe-
ter urine looked turbid. The culture grew  K. pneumo-
niae resistant to meropenem. The suprapubic catheter 
had been inserted nine days earlier during an outpa-
tient visit to the tertiary care hospital due to urinary 
obstruction. An earlier urine culture from this patient 
in March had been negative (information on the clinical 
indication for that culture is not available).
Screening and contact tracing
After the detection of the index case, all patients 
on Ward A were screened for KPC-KP. Screening 
was repeated weekly until there were no new posi-
tive KPC-KP findings on the ward for two consecutive 
screening rounds, thereafter monthly until all known 
KPC-KP-carriers were discharged. In addition, the three 
other wards of Hospital A were screened twice, one 
ward in Hospital B was screened once and three pri-
mary care wards at Hospital B that had frequent patient 
transfers to Ward A (Hospital A) were screened twice.
All patients who had been on Ward A since 1 May 2013 
or been roommates of KPC-KP carriers in January 2013 
or later (until 10 June 2013) were defined as exposed 
and thus screened. Discharged patients were screened 
as outpatients. Those who had been in other rooms 
than the KPC-KP carriers but on the same ward between 
January and April were flagged to be screened at a 
new admission. Altogether, 101 exposed patients were 
identified. Two negative sets of screening specimens at 
least one week after the end of exposure were required 
to rule out KPC-KP.
All KPC-KP carriers and their family members were inter-
viewed about previous stays in hospitals abroad. The 
stays and room locations of all KPC-KP carriers at differ-
ent hospitals and wards during the preceding six months 
were carefully evaluated to identify potential transmis-
sion links. The laboratory results of patients hospital-
ised concurrently in the same hospital were reviewed 
for findings of multidrug-resistant Enterobacteriaceae.
A screening set included stool or rectal swab, swabs of 
chronic wounds and catheter urine. Screening for the 
presence of multidrug-resistant Enterobacteriaceae was 
done by plating specimens on selective chromogenic 
KPC plates (CHROMagar, France). Isolates were iden-
tified by matrix-assisted laser desorption/ionisation 
time-of-flight (MALDI-TOF) mass spectrometry (VITEK 
MS, bioMeriéux), and antimicrobial susceptibilities 
were determined by disc diffusion method according to 
standards of the European Committee on Antimicrobial 
Susceptibility Testing (EUCAST) [13] or by gradient 
MIC determination (Etest, bioMeriéux). For isolates 
with reduced susceptibility to any carbapenem, the 
presence of carbapenemase genes was analysed by 
multiplex real-time PCR [14]. The strains possessing 
carbapenemase genes were subjected to multilocus 
sequence typing (MLST) and pulsed-field gel electro-
phoresis (PFGE) [11].
Other infection control measures and 
environmental cultures
The infection control teams of the primary and tertiary 
care hospitals worked closely together. KPC-KP carri-
ers and patients exposed to KPC-KP were transferred 
into single rooms or cohorts, treated in contact isola-
tion and flagged in the electronic patient charts at both 
hospitals. Ward A was closed for new admissions from 
19 June to 26 July 2013.
Infection control measures (hand hygiene, standard 
precautions and contact isolation) at Ward A were pro-
moted by a lecture given by an infectious diseases 
specialist and frequent visits by the infection control 
nurse to the ward meetings up to two or three times a 
week during the summer. In addition, there were three 
summarising meetings with the infection control team 
and the hospital administration. Healthcare workers’ 
hands were inspected for rings, bracelets and chronic 
wounds, and compliance with hand hygiene and envi-
ronmental cleaning procedures was monitored by the 
infection control nurse during the ward visits. The use 
of the disinfecting washing machine, washing room 
cleaning and disinfection (especially the bunk and 
shower chairs) were reviewed and written instructions 
were provided. Only permanent and trained cleaners 
were allowed to work at Ward A. Hypochlorite disin-
fectant was introduced for daily surface cleaning in the 
rooms of KPC-KP carriers and the washing room. The 
indications to use urinary catheters and antimicrobial 
practices were reviewed.
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Altogether, 10 culture swabs were taken at Ward A from 
various surfaces frequently touched and thus sus-
pected to be contaminated, e.g. in patient rooms and 
in bathrooms.
Risk factor analysis
To identify risk factors for KPC-KP carriage, a case–
cohort study was performed. The charts of all patients 
(nine KPC-KP carriers and 133 non-carries) present at 
the four wards of Hospital A on the day of the first 
screening round during 14 to 17 June were reviewed by 
three doctors, MK, KS and KR. Analyses were performed 
with SPSS (version 20.0 Chicago, IL, US). Differences in 
the frequency of dichotomic variables between KPC-KP 
carriers and non-carriers were compared by Fisher’s 
exact test and the means of continuous variables were 
compared by Mann–Whitney and Kruskal–Wallis tests. 
Multivariable logistic regression analysis was done 
with backward selection using Akaike information cri-
teria (AIC). 
Results
KPC-KP screening and contact tracing
After the detection of the index case, the first screen-
ing round at Ward A revealed four KPC-KP-carriers 
in a four-bed room that was used for five patients at 
the time. In each of the four following weekly rounds, 
one additional KPC-KP carrier was identified (Figure): 
Patient 6 was a roommate of the index case, Patient 
7 was the fifth patient in the overcrowded four-bed 
room, and the last two patients (number 8 and 9) 
were in two additional rooms. Patients 6 to 9 had two, 
one, two and three negative screening results, respec-
tively, before becoming positive. No new KPC-KP were 
detected in the sixth and seventh screening rounds. 
The highest prevalence of KPC-KP carriers on Ward A 
was nine of 38. Specimens obtained during screening 
as well as clinical specimens obtained at other wards 
(B, C and D in Hospital A) and at Hospital B) revealed 
no KPC-KP-carriers. Altogether, 535 screening speci-
mens were collected between 14 June and 2 August in 
seven screening rounds on Ward A and two screening 
rounds on Wards B, C and D.
No additional KPC-KP-carriers were found among the 
101 exposed patients: Those still present on Ward A 
(n = 18) were included in the screening rounds there 
and those transferred to long-term care facilities 
(n = 27) or discharged home (n = 37) were screened 
as outpatients. Results for all of them were negative 
until the end of October 2013. Nineteen of the exposed 
patients had died before screening. 
Apart from two patients with KPC-KP only in catheter 
urine, all nine positive patients had KPC-KP in stools 
or rectal swab and one also in a sacral wound. The fol-
low-up screenings showed that four patients spontane-
ously lost KPC-KP-carriage within one month, while four 
had persistent or intermittent carriage for at least three 
months (Figure). One KPC-KP carrier died before any 
follow-up screening could be done. None of the KPC-KP 
carriers developed clinical infection during a six-month 
follow-up period. By the end of September 2013, four 
of the nine KPC-KP carriers had died due to unrelated 
underlying diseases, two of them while still on Ward A. 
Of the nine, four had been admitted to a long-term care 
facility and three were discharged home.
None of the nine KPC-KP-carriers had been travelling 
abroad during the year before the outbreak. None of 
their family members had been hospitalised abroad. All 
but two of the KPC-KP-carriers had contact to Hospital 
B, neither at an outpatient visit during their stay in 
primary care nor at a direct admission. Review of the 
charts from patients staying at the same time on the 
same wards in Hospital B as the KPC-KP-carriers did 
Figure
Duration and location of hospital stays of patients colonised with Klebsiella pneumoniae carbapenemase-producing  
K. pneumonia, Finland, 2013 (n = 9) 
KPC-KP: Klebsiella pneumoniae carbapenemase-producing K. pneumoniae.
The date of KPC-KP detection and positive follow-up screenings are marked with P and the dates of negative screening results are marked with 
N. Colours indicate the various wards a patient was staying on.
Patient
Rooms 
at Ward A January February March April May June July August September October Novemver December
1 1 P N P P
2 7 P N Ex
3 7, 3, 7 P Ex
4 7 P P P N
5 7, 3, 7 P P P N
6 1 NN P N N N N
7 7 N P N N Ex
8 11, 13, 14, 10, 15 N N P N N
9 15, 16, 10 N N N P N N P P Ex
N Negative screening for KPC-KP Tertiary care internal medicine 1
P Positive for KPC Tertiary care emergency
Ex Death Tertiary care pulmonology
Outbreak Ward A
Tertiary care surgery ward 1
Primary care ward 1 in another hospital
Tertiary care surgery ward 2
Primary care ward 2 in another hospital
Tertary care internal medicine ward 2
Long-term care facility
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not provide indications as to the origin of the KPC-KP 
outbreak either.
Microbiological characterisation of isolates
All nine KPC-KP isolates represented the same MLST 
type ST512 (a single locus variant of ST258). PFGE anal-
yses showed that all the strains were closely related. 
Seven strains had identical PFGE profiles (PFGE type 
A). Two strains, isolated four and 10 days after the first 
strain, had minor differences compared with the PFGE 
type A, i.e. PFGE type A1 differed in three bands (of 21 
bands seen in the PFGE gel) from type A and PFGE type 
A2 differed in two bands (of 21 bands seen in the PFGE 
gel) from type A. In addition, types A1 and A2 differed 
from each other in four bands. 
The isolates were resistant to all beta-lactams (all had 
a minimum inhibitory concentration (MIC) for mero-
penem of > 32 mg/L): mecillinam, nitrofurantoin, cip-
rofloxacin, tobramycin, amikacin and trimethoprim. 
Their susceptibility varied for gentamicin, fosfomycin, 
tigecycline, sulfadiazine/trimethoprim and colistin. At 
the presence of 1 µg/mL rifampicin, the colistin MICs 
were reduced by a factor of 4 or 8, which rendered iso-
lates in eight patients potentially sensitive to colistin 
(MIC < 2) (data not shown).
Other infection control measures and 
environmental cultures
No skin breaks, rings or bracelets were found on the 
hands of healthcare workers. The ward audits revealed 
weaknesses in the placement of hand rub dispensers, 
the placement of clean urinary bottles in the toilets and 
in the cleaning of bathrooms. During the years 2012 
and 2013, the use of alcohol hand rub had increased 
from 26.5 to 40.2 L per 1,000 patient-days at ward A.
None of the 10 surface swabs was culture-positive for 
KPC-KP.
Risk factors for KPC-KP
All nine KPC-KP carriers were older than 70 years and 
had underling illnesses (eight patients with McCabe 
score ≥ 2 [15]) (Table). Three were receiving antimicrobial 
treatment on the day the sample for their positive test 
was taken, one of which was considered inappropriate 
by the authors when reviewed for this study. KPC-KP 
carriers were more likely to have received antimicro-
bial treatment within three months than non-carriers 
(9/9 vs 90/133). The last date of antibiotic treatment 
was available for those who had stopped the treatment 
before screening, namely six of the nine carriers and 63 
of the 133 non-carriers. It was more recent among the 
carriers than among non-carriers, a mean of 40 and 77 
days before the first screening, respectively. Several of 
the carriers had multiple risk factors for contaminating 
their surroundings (Table): of those, six were not bed-
ridden and four had advanced dementia. Five needed a 
bathroom chair or bunk for showering. However, none 
of the differences between carriers and non-carriers or 
between Ward A and other wards reached statistical 
significance (Table).
To evaluate risk factors for KPC-KP carriage, we 
included the following variables in the multivariable 
model: age, McCabe 3, any antimicrobial at the screen-
ing day, admission from tertiary care, immunosup-
pression, chronic wound, length of stay in the primary 
care hospital, incontinence in stools, urinary catheter, 
wheel chair, private toileting, room size 3 or more, 
and any antimicrobials within three months before the 
screening day, but none of them was an independent 
explanatory variable for KPC-KP-carriage. 
Discussion
The KPC-KP outbreak described here involved nine 
patients with asymptomatic colonisation and has been 
the largest in Finland so far. The outbreak was confined 
to one geriatric ward. The fact that the index case was 
found by chance in a clinical culture taken without pre-
scription and that no direct link to travel abroad was 
detected, suggests the possibility that hidden coloni-
sations may also be present elsewhere. That the out-
break ward was a dedicated cohort ward for patients 
with carriage of MDROs was only a coincidence, but it 
may have improved the containment of the outbreak 
because the staff was familiar with contact precau-
tions. Rapid and extensive screening together with 
cohorting and isolating carriers and exposed patients 
were other essential tools in controlling the outbreak.
KPC-KP strain ST 512 was probably imported to Finland 
by an unrecognised infected or colonised patient. 
All CPE strains (Escherichia coli  and  K. pneumoniae) 
detected in Finland are being typed using MLST, but 
ST512 had not been detected in Finland before. After 
the 2013 outbreak, two single ST512 isolates were 
found in Northern Finland, in August 2013 and January 
2014, also without obvious link to abroad, one in a 
tertiary care and the other in a primary care hospital 
(data not shown). This is another indication of hidden 
transmission of ST512 in Finland or of importation by 
several patients. ST512 is a single-locus variant of the 
widely spread KPC-2 ST258 clone. It was first described 
in Israel among isolates producing KPC-3 enzyme [16]. 
Later it caused outbreaks in the Czech Republic among 
hospital patients repatriated from Italy [17].
Routine screening for MDROs in Finland applies to 
patients repatriated from hospitals in other countries 
and asylum seekers needing hospital care. Screening 
also covers all patients seeking hospital care with a 
history of previous hospitalisation in another country in 
the preceding year. The screening covers MRSA, vanco-
mycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) and multidrug-resist-
ant gram-negative rods, including extended-spectrum 
beta-lactamase producers (ESBL) and CPE. In addition, 
patients exposed in Finnish hospitals (roommates of 
newly identified carriers or patients staying on the 
affected ward during an outbreak) are also screened. 
In an outbreak situation, the exposed patients are 
screened immediately, during their hospital stay. If they 
have already been discharged home, infection control 
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nurses either contact and screen the patients as soon 
as the exposure becomes evident or flag the patients 
in the electronic patient charts to be screened at the 
next admission, depending on the available resources 
and the characteristics of the outbreak. More universal 
screening for multidrug-resistant gram-negative rods is 
not routinely performed in Finland.
In our epidemiological situation with no previous 
domestic CPE outbreaks, we decided to screen the 
whole ward after detecting a single nosocomial patient 
with KPC-KP. After it became clear that it was an out-
break, we chose to start multiple follow-up screenings, 
as recommended by Finnish guidelines, the European 
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and the US 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in this type 
of setting [3,18,19].
KPC-KP carriers were placed in contact isolation and 
remained there even after negative results in follow-up 
cultures. Also patients who were considered exposed 
were pre-emptively isolated until carriage was ruled 
out. At the outbreak ward, the annual alcohol hand 
rub use increased by 50%, to more than 40 L per 1,000 
patient-days, which is generally considered good, 
allowing at least six safe visits per patient per day (3 
mL before and after a touch). Screening, contact pre-
cautions, cohorting and cleaning have been the key 
factors for successful control in several outbreak set-
tings [6,7,20]. Some hospitals have also used chlo-
rhexidine bathing for patients as well as screening of 
staff, although no cases were detected on that occa-
sion [7,20]. In endemic settings, for instance in Israel, 
national interventions including active surveillance, 
carrier isolation and cohorting of patients and staff 
have shown to be effective [21].
Despite the control measures, we detected new KPC-KP 
carriers in consecutive screenings for almost one 
month after the detection of the index case. In our 
experience, only one set of specimens, including fae-
ces or rectal swab, wound swab and catheter urine, 
was not enough to rule out KPC-KP carriage. This may 
be due to lack of compliance with the control measures 
and ongoing transmission and/or to low sensitivity of 
the KPC-KP screening. In addition, most patients did 
not have any wounds or urinary catheters and therefore 
submitted only faecal or rectal swabs. However, rectal 
cultures have been suggested to be the most sensitive 
single method for detection of CPE colonisation [22]. 
The follow-up culturing further suggested that carriage 
can be intermittent or short-lived, which has also been 
shown elsewhere [21].
Antibiotic selection pressure has been shown to have 
an impact on the spread of KPC-KP [7]. In our study, one 
third of all patients in the hospital were on antimicro-
bial treatment at the time of the chart review and two 
thirds had received antimicrobials within the preced-
ing three months. Risk factor analysis also revealed a 
tendency that recent antimicrobial use may be a risk 
Table
Characteristics of patients screened for Klebsiella 
pneumoniae carbapenemase-producing K. pneumoniae, 
Finland, 2013 (n = 142)
KPC-KP (n = 9) No KPC-KP (n = 133)
Time (SD) Time (SD)
Mean age (years)  83 (SD 11.4) 76 (SD 11.1)
LOS primary care hospital (days) 81 (SD 54.2) 53 (SD 74.9)
LOS total hospitalisation (days) 101 (SD 57.8) 88 (SD 96.1)
Days since last antimicrobial 
treatment (mean) 40 (SD 17.4) 77 (SD 167.0)
n n
Male sex 3 60
Previous ESBL carriage 0 9
Admission from tertiary care 6 98
Visit to tertiary care hospital 
during stay 3 29
Surgery at tertiary care during 
hospitalisation 1 42
Room with ≥ 3 beds 8 82
Ward change during stay 0 5
Room change during stay 4 62
Any antimicrobial treatment on 
study daya 3 45
Cephalosporin treatment on 
study day 2 16
Fluoroquinolone treatment on 
study day 0 13
Carbapenem treatment on study 
day 0 0
Other antimicrobial treatment 
on study day 2 21
Antimicrobial treatment within 
last three months 9 90
Carbapenem treatment within 
last three months 1 8
McCabe1 1 12
McCabe2 6 99
McCabe3 2 22
Immunosuppression 1 12
Dementia 4 62
Bedridden/wheelchair 3 74
Did not need assistance in the 
toilet 4 44
Stool incontinence 4 56
Chronic wound 2 31
Urinary catheter 3 24
ESBL: extended-spectrum beta-lactamase producers; KPC-KP: 
Klebsiella pneumoniae carbapenemase-producing K. pneumoniae; 
LOS: length of stay; SD: standard deviation.
None of the characteristics covered in this Table were significantly 
associated with carriage of KPC-KP.
a  One patient received two antibiotics.
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for KPC-KP carriage. This underlines the importance of 
prudent antimicrobial use in long-term care. One fifth 
of the treatments were considered inappropriate by 
three reviewing doctors in that they were prescribed for 
colonisation or for unspecific symptoms or for too long.
 
In Europe, most KPC-KP outbreak reports are from 
acute care hospitals, e.g. in France, Germany and 
Greece, where up to 30–70% of case-patients had clin-
ical infections [6,8,9,23]. In our outbreak, the lack of 
infections may also have been due to early detection 
of the outbreak and to the level of care: no invasive 
procedures, mechanical ventilation or dialysis were 
provided at the primary care hospital. The index case 
was asymptomatic when the urine culture was taken by 
the nurse without a physician’s prescription. Culturing 
asymptomatic bacteriuria or uninfected wounds is 
usually discouraged because it may lead to inappro-
priate antibiotic use. This recommendation may now 
need to be seen in a different light if we suspect hid-
den MDRO-colonisations in Finland: we may even need 
to encourage staff on long-term care wards to culture 
uninfected wounds and catheter urine regularly, just 
to screen for resistance, because true clinical infec-
tions caused by these pathogens are not common in 
long-term care. This, together with continuous train-
ing on antibiotic policy, may serve early detection of 
MDRO. It also conforms with the policy of this par-
ticular hospital. Earlier, the hospital had made excep-
tional efforts in routine universal MRSA screening, with 
only few cases detected, and now wants to focus on 
other MDROs. In addition, long-term care facilities can 
become reservoirs of MDRO due to the presence of sev-
eral risk factors for spread such as dementia and stool 
incontinence.
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